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Abstract
Face presentation attacks have become an increasingly crit-
ical concern when face recognition is widely applied. Many
face anti-spoofing methods have been proposed, but most of
them ignore the generalization ability to unseen attacks. To
overcome the limitation, this work casts face anti-spoofing
as a domain generalization (DG) problem, and attempts to
address this problem by developing a new meta-learning
framework called Regularized Fine-grained Meta-learning.
To let our face anti-spoofing model generalize well to un-
seen attacks, the proposed framework trains our model to
perform well in the simulated domain shift scenarios, which
is achieved by finding generalized learning directions in the
meta-learning process. Specifically, the proposed framework
incorporates the domain knowledge of face anti-spoofing
as the regularization so that meta-learning is conducted in
the feature space regularized by the supervision of domain
knowledge. This enables our model more likely to find gener-
alized learning directions with the regularized meta-learning
for face anti-spoofing task. Besides, to further enhance the
generalization ability of our model, the proposed framework
adopts a fine-grained learning strategy that simultaneously
conducts meta-learning in a variety of domain shift scenar-
ios in each iteration. Extensive experiments on four public
datasets validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Introduction
Face recognition, as one of the computer vision tech-
niques (Lan et al. 2019; Ye et al. 2019), has been success-
fully applied in a variety of applications in the real life,
such as automated teller machines (ATMs), mobile pay-
ments, and entrance guard systems. Although much conve-
nience is brought by the face recognition technique, many
kinds of face presentation attacks (PA) also appear. Easy-
accessible human faces from the Internet or social media can
be abused to produce print attacks (i.e. based on the printed
photo papers) or video replay attacks (i.e. based on the digi-
tal image/videos). These attacks can successfully hack a face
recognition system deployed in a mobile phone or a laptop
because those spoofs are visually extremely close to the gen-
uine faces. Therefore, how to protect our face recognition
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Figure 1: Idea of the proposed regularized fine-grained
meta-learning framework. By incorporating domain knowl-
edge as regularization, meta-learning is conducted in the fea-
ture space regularized by the domain knowledge supervi-
sion. Thus, generalized learning directions are more likely
to be found for task of face anti-spoofing. Besides, the pro-
posed framework adopts a fine-grained learning strategy that
simultaneously conducts meta-learning in a variety of do-
main shift scenarios. Thus, more abundant domain shift in-
formation of face anti-spoofing task can be exploited.
systems against these presentation attacks has become an in-
creasingly critical issue in the face recognition community.
Many face anti-spoofing methods have been proposed.
Appearance-based methods choose to extract various ap-
pearance cues to differentiate real and fake (Boulkenafet,
Komulainen, and Hadid 2016; 2016; Wen, Han, and Jain
2015; Yang, Lei, and Li. 2014); Temporal-based meth-
ods aim to do differentiation based on various temporal
cues (Pereira and et al 2014; Shao, Lan, and Yuen 2019;
2017; Liu, Lan, and Yuen 2018; Liu, Jourabloo, and Liu
2018). Although these methods obtain promising perfor-
mance in intra-dataset experiments where training and test-
ing data are from the same dataset, the performance dramat-
ically degrades in cross-dataset experiments where models
are trained on one dataset and tested on a related but shifted
dataset. This is because existing face anti-spoofing methods
capture the differentiation cues that are dataset biased (An-
tonio and Efros 2011), and thus cannot generalize well to
unseen testing data that have different feature distribution
compared to training data (mainly caused by different mate-
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
10
77
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
5 N
ov
 20
19
...
Θ1 
Θ0 
Θ2 ...
Θ1 
Θ0 
Θ2 
∆ 
Ltrn 
∆ 
Ltrn 
∆ 
Ltst
∆ 
Ltst
∆ 
Ltrn 
∆ 
Ltst
∆ 
Ltst
∆ 
Ltrn 
∆ 
Ltrn 
∆ 
Ltst
∆ 
Ltst
∆ 
Ltrn 
Real Depth
Fake Depth
Domain 
Knowledge
(a) Vanilla meta-learning (b) Regularized fine-grained meta-learning
Figure 2: Comparison of learning directions between (a)
vanilla meta-learning, and (b) regularized fine-grained meta-
learning. Three source domains are used as examples. Dot-
ted arrows with different colors denote the learning di-
rections (gradients) of meta-train (∇Ltrn) and meta-test
(∇Ltst) in different domains. Solid arrows denote the sum-
marized learning directions of meta-optimization. θi (i =
0, 1, ...) are the updated model parameters in i-th iteration.
rials of attacks or recording environments).
To overcome this limitation, this paper casts face anti-
spoofing as a domain generalization (DG) problem. Com-
pared to the traditional unsupervised domain adaptation
(UDA) (Shao, Lan, and Yuen 2018; Saito et al. 2018;
Mancini et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018b; Chen et al. 2018;
Pinheiro 2018; Tzeng et al. 2017; Bousmalis et al. 2017;
Volpi et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018a; Bhushan Damodaran,
Kellenberger, and et al 2018; Shao and Lan 2019) that as-
sume access to the labeled source domain data and unlabeled
target domain data, DG assumes no access to target domain
information. For DG, multiple source domains are exploited
to learn the model which can generalize well to unseen test
data in the target domain. For the task of face anti-spoofing,
because we do not know what kind of attacks will be pre-
sented to our face recognition system, we have no clue on
the testing dataset (target domain data) when we train our
model so that DG is more suitable for our task.
Inspired by (Finn, Abbeel, and Levine 2017; Li et al.
2018a), this paper aims to address problem of DG for face
anti-spoofing in a meta-learning framework. However, if we
directly apply existing vanilla meta-learning for DG algo-
rithms on the task of face anti-spoofing, the performance
will be degraded due to the following two issues: 1) It is
found that face anti-spoofing models only with binary class
supervision discover arbitrary differentiation cues with poor
generalization (Liu, Jourabloo, and Liu 2018). As such, as
illustrated in Fig. 2(a), if vanilla meta-learning algorithms
are applied in face anti-spoofing only with the supervision
of the binary class labels, the learning directions in the
meta-train and meta-test steps will be arbitrary and biased,
which makes it difficult for the meta-optimization step to
summarize and find a generalized learning direction finally.
2) Vanilla meta-learning for DG methods (Li et al. 2018a)
coarsely divide multiple source domains into two groups to
form one aggregated meta-train and one aggregated meta-
test domains in each iteration of meta-learning. Thus only a
single domain shift scenario is simulated in each iteration,
which is sub-optimal for the task of face anti-spoofing. In
order to equip the model with the generalization ability to
unseen attacks of various scenarios, a variety of domain shift
scenarios instead of a single one that are simulated for meta-
learning is more optimal for the task of face anti-spoofing.
To address the above two issues, as illustrated in Fig. 1,
this paper proposes a novel regularized fine-grained meta-
learning framework. For the first issue, compared to bi-
nary class labels, domain knowledge specific to the task of
face anti-spoofing can provide more generalized differenti-
ation information. Therefore, as illustrated in Fig .2(b), the
proposed framework incorporates the domain knowledge of
face anti-spoofing as regularization into feature learning pro-
cess so that meta-learning is conducted in the feature space
regularized by the auxiliary supervision of domain knowl-
edge. In this way, this regularized meta-learning can focus
on more coordinated and better-generalized learning direc-
tions in the meta-train and meta-test for task of face anti-
spoofing. Therefore, the summarized learning direction in
the meta-optimization can guide face anti-spoofing model
to exploit more generalized differentiation cues. Besides,
for the second issue, the proposed framework adopts a fine-
grained learning strategy as shown in Fig .2(b). This strategy
divides source domains into multiple meta-train and meta-
test domains, and jointly conducts meta-learning between
each pair of them in each iteration. As such, a variety of do-
main shift scenarios are simultaneously simulated and thus
more abundant domain shift information can be exploited in
the meta-learning to train a generalized face anti-spoofing
model.
Related Work
Face Anti-spoofing Methods. Current face anti-spoofing
methods can be roughly categorized into appearance-based
methods and temporal-based methods. Appearance-based
methods are proposed to extract different appearance cues
for attacks detection. Multi-scale LBP (Ma¨a¨tta¨, Hadid, and
Pietika¨inen 2011) and color textures (Boulkenafet, Komu-
lainen, and Hadid 2016) methods are proposed to extract
various LBP descriptors in various color spaces for the
differentiation between real/fake. Image distortion analy-
sis (Wen, Han, and Jain 2015) detects the surface distor-
tions due to lower appearance quality of images or videos
compared to the real face skin. Yang et al. (Yang, Lei, and
Li. 2014) trains CNN to extract discriminative deep fea-
tures for real/fake faces classification. On the other hand,
temporal-based methods aim to extract different tempo-
ral cues through multiple frames to differentiate real/fake
faces. Dynamic texture methods proposed in (Pereira and
et al 2014; Shao, Lan, and Yuen 2019; 2017) try to ex-
tract different facial motions. Liu et al. (Liu et al. 2016;
Liu, Lan, and Yuen 2018) propose to capture discrimina-
tive rPPG signals from real/fake faces. (Liu, Jourabloo, and
Liu 2018) learns a CNN-RNN model to estimate the dif-
ferent face depth and rPPG signals between real/fake faces.
However, the performance of both appearance and temporal-
based methods become degraded in cross-datasets test where
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Figure 3: Overview of proposed framework. We simulate
domain shift by randomly dividing original N source do-
mains in each iteration. Supervision of domain knowledge
is incorporated via depth estimator to regularize the learning
process of feature extractor. Thus, meta learner conducts the
meta-learning in the feature space regularized by the auxil-
iary supervision of domain knowledge.
unseen attacks are encountered. This is because all the above
methods are likely to extract some differentiation cues that
are biased to specific materials of attacks or recording envi-
ronments in training datasets. Comparatively, the proposed
method conducts meta-learning for DG in the simulated do-
main shift scenarios, which is designed to make our model
generalize well and capture more generalized differentiation
cues for the task of face anti-spoofing. Note that a recent
work (Shao et al. 2019) proposes multi-adversarial discrim-
inative deep domain generalization for face anti-spoofing. It
assumes that generalized differentiation cues can be discov-
ered by searching a shared and discriminative feature space
via adversarial learning. However, there is no guarantee that
such a feature space exists among multiple source domains.
Moreover, it needs to train multiple extra discriminators for
all source domains. Comparatively, this paper does not need
such a strong assumption and meta-learning can be con-
ducted without training extra discriminators networks for
adversarial learning, which is more efficient.
Meta-learning for Domain Generalization Methods.
Unlike meta-learning for few-shot learning (Finn, Abbeel,
and Levine 2017), meta-learning for DG is relatively less
explored. MLDG (Li et al. 2018a) designs a model-agnostic
meta-learning for DG. Reptile (Nichol, Achiam, and Schul-
man. 2018) is a general first-order meta-learning method
that can be easily adapted into DG task. MetaReg (Balaji
and et al 2018) learns regularizers for DG in a meta-learning
framework. However, directly applying the aforementioned
methods in the task of face anti-spoofing may encounter
the two issues mentioned above. Comparatively, our method
conducts meta-learning in the feature space regularized by
auxiliary supervision of domain knowledge within a fine-
grained learning strategy. This contributes a more feasible
meta-learning for DG in the task of face anti-spoofing.
Proposed Method
The overall proposed framework is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Domain Shift Simulating
Suppose that we have access to N source domains of face
anti-spoofing task, denoted as D = [D1, D2, ..., DN ]. The
objective of DG for face anti-spoofing is to make the model
trained on the N source domains can generalize well to un-
seen attacks from the target domain. To this end, at each
training iteration, we divide the original N source domains
by randomly selectingN−1 domains as meta-train domains
(denoted as Dtrn) and the remaining one as the meta-test
domain (denoted as Dval). As such, the training and testing
domain shift in the real world can be simulated. In this way,
our model can learn how to perform well in the domain shift
scenarios through many training iterations and thus learn to
generalize well to unseen attacks.
Regularized Fine-grained Meta-learning
Several existing vanilla meta-learning for DG methods can
be applied to achieve the above objective. But their perfor-
mance degrade for the task of face anti-spoofing due to the
two issues mentioned in the introduction. To address these
issues, this paper proposes a new meta-learning framework
called regularized fine-grained meta-learning. In each meta-
train and meta-test domain, we are provided with image and
label pairs denoted as x and y, where y are ground truth with
binary class labels (y = 0/1 is the label of fake/real face).
Compared to the binary class labels, domain knowledge spe-
cific to the face anti-spoofing task can provide more general-
ized differentiation information. This paper adopts the face
depth map as the domain knowledge. By comparing the spa-
tial information, it can be observed that live faces have face-
like depth, while faces of attacks presented in the flat and
planar papers or video screens have no face depth. In this
way, for the first issue, we incorporate this domain knowl-
edge as regularization into feature learning process so that
meta-learning can be conducted in the feature space regu-
larized by the auxiliary supervision of domain knowledge.
Thus, this regularized meta-learning in the feature space can
focus on better-generalized learning directions in meta-train
and meta-test for task of face anti-spoofing. To this end, as
illustrated in Fig. 3, a convolutional neural network is pro-
posed in our framework that composes of a feature extractor
(denoted as F ) and a meta learner (denoted as M ). Then a
depth estimator (denoted as D) is further integrated into our
network, through which domain knowledge can be incor-
porated. Besides, to address the second issue, the proposed
framework adopts a fine-grained learning strategy that meta-
learning is jointly conducted among N − 1 meta-train do-
mains and one meta-test domain in each iteration, by which
a variety of domain shift scenarios are simultaneously ex-
ploited in each iteration. The whole meta-learning process
is summarized in Algorithm 1 and the details are as follows:
Meta-Train. We sample batches in every meta-train do-
mainDtrn, denoted as T̂i (i = 1, ..., N−1), and we conduct
the cross-entropy classification based on the binary class la-
bels in each meta-train domain as follows:
LCls(T̂i)(θF , θM )
=
∑
(x,y)∼T̂i
ylogM(F (x)) + (1− y)log(1−M(F (x))) (1)
where θF and θM are the parameters of the feature extrac-
tor and the meta learner. In each meta-train domain, We
can thus search the learning direction by calculating gradi-
ent of meta learner w.r.t the loss (∇θMLCls(T̂i)(θF , θM )).
The updated meta learner can be calculated as θMi
′ =
θM − α∇θMLCls(T̂i)(θF , θM ). In the meantime, we incor-
porate face depth maps as the domain knowledge to regu-
larize the above learning process of the feature extractor as
follows:
LDep(T̂i)(θF , θD) =
∑
(x,I)∼T̂i
‖D(F (x))− I‖2 (2)
where θD is the parameter of the depth estimator and I are
the pre-calculated face depth maps for input face images. We
use the state-of-the-art dense face alignment network named
PRNet (Feng et al. 2018) to estimate depth maps of real
faces, which serve as the supervision for the real faces. At-
tacks are assumed to have no face depth so that depth maps
of all zeros are set as the supervision for fake faces.
Meta-Test. Moreover, we sample batch in the one re-
maining meta-test domain Dval, denoted as T˜ . By adopt-
ing fine-grained learning strategy, we encourage our face
anti-spoofing model trained on every meta-train domain can
simultaneously perform well on the disjoint meta-test do-
main so that our model can be trained to generalize well to
unseen attacks of various scenarios. Thus, multiple cross-
entropy classifications are jointly conducted over all the up-
dated meta learners:
N−1∑
i=1
LCls(T˜ )(θF , θMi ′) =
N−1∑
i=1
∑
(x,y)∼T˜
ylogMi
′(F (x)) + (1− y)log(1−Mi′(F (x)))
(3)
The domain knowledge is also incorporated like meta-train:
LDep(T˜ )(θF , θD) =
∑
(x,I)∼T˜
‖D(F (x))− I‖2 (4)
Meta-Optimization. To summarize all the learning infor-
mation in the meta-train and meta-test for optimization, we
jointly train the three modules in our network as follows:
θM ← θM − β∇θM (
N−1∑
i=1
(LCls(T̂i)(θF , θM ) + LCls(T˜ )(θF , θMi
′)))
(5)
θF ← θF − β∇θF (LDep(T˜ )(θF , θD) +
N−1∑
i=1
(LCls(T̂i)(θF , θM )
+ LDep(T̂i)(θF , θD) + LCls(T˜ )(θF , θMi
′)))
(6)
Algorithm 1 Regularized Fine-grained Meta Face Anti-spoofing
Require:
Input: N source domains D = [D1, D2, ..., DN ],
Initialization: Model parameters θF , θD, θM . Hyperparame-
ters α, β
1: while not done do
2: Randomly select (N − 1) source domains in D as Dtrn,
and the remaining one as Dval
3: Meta-train: Sampling batch in each domain in Dtrn as T̂i
(i = 1, ..., N − 1)
4: for each T̂i do
5: LCls(T̂i)(θF , θM ) =
∑
(x,y)∼T̂i
ylogM(F (x)) + (1 −
y)log(1−M(F (x)))
6: θMi
′ = θM − α∇θMLCls(T̂i)(θF , θM )
7: LDep(T̂i)(θF , θD) =
∑
(x,I)∼T̂i ‖D(F (x))− I‖
2
8: end for
9: Meta-test: Sampling batch in Dval as T˜
10:
N−1∑
i=1
LCls(T˜ )(θF , θMi ′) =
N−1∑
i=1
∑
(x,y)∼T˜
ylogMi
′(F (x)) +
(1− y)log(1−Mi′(F (x)))
11: LDep(T˜ )(θF , θD) =
∑
(x,I)∼T˜ ‖D(F (x))− I‖2
12: Meta-optimization:
13: θM ← θM − β∇θM (
N−1∑
i=1
(LCls(T̂i)(θF , θM ) +
LCls(T˜ )(θF , θMi ′)))
14: θF ← θF − β∇θF (LDep(T˜ )(θF , θD) +
N−1∑
i=1
(LCls(T̂i)(θF , θM ) + LDep(T̂i)(θF , θD) +
LCls(T˜ )(θF , θMi ′)))
15: θD ← θD − β∇θD (LDep(T˜ )(θF , θD) +
N−1∑
i=1
(LDep(T̂i)(θF , θD)))
16: end while
17: return Model parameters θF , θD, θM
θD ← θD − β∇θD (LDep(T˜ )(θF , θD) +
N−1∑
i=1
(LDep(T̂i)(θF , θD)))
(7)
Note that in (6), regression losses of depth estimation pro-
vides auxiliary supervision in the optimization of feature ex-
tractor. This can regularize the feature learning process of
the feature extractor. In this way, the classifications in (1)
and (3) within the meta learner are restrictively conducted
in the feature space regularized by the auxiliary supervision
of domain knowledge. This makes meta-train and meta-test
focus on better-generalized learning directions.
Analysis. This section provides more detailed analysis on
the proposed method. The objective of (5) in the meta-
optimization is as follows (omitting θF for simplicity):
min
θM
N−1∑
i=1
(LCls(T̂i)(θM ) + LCls(T˜ )(θMi
′)) (8)
We do the first-order Taylor expansion on the second term
as follows:
LCls(T˜ )(θMi ′) = LCls(T˜ )(θM − α∇θMLCls(T̂i)(θM )) =
LCls(T˜ )(θM ) +∇θMLCls(T˜ )(θM )T (−α∇θMLCls(T̂i)(θM ))
(9)
and the objective becomes:
min
θM
N−1∑
i=1
(LCls(T̂i)(θM ) + LCls(T˜ )(θM )
− α(∇θMLCls(T̂i)(θM )
T ·∇θMLCls(T˜ )(θM )))
(10)
The above objective shows that meta-optimization finds the
generalized learning direction in the meta learner through: 1)
minimizing losses in all meta-train and meta-test domains
2) meanwhile coordinating the learning directions (gradi-
ents information) between meta-train and meta-test so that
the optimization can be conducted without overfitting to a
single domain. It should be noted that there are two ma-
jor differences compared to vanilla meta-learning for DG:
1) the above objective is conducted in feature space reg-
ularized by the domain knowledge supervision instead of
in instance space (Li et al. 2018a). This makes both meta-
train and meta-test focus on better-generalized learning di-
rections and thus their learning directions are more likely
to be coordinated in the task of face anti-spoofing (in the
above third term). 2) vanilla meta-learning for DG (Li et al.
2018a) is simply conducted between one aggregated meta-
train domain and one aggregated meta-test domain in each
iteration. Comparatively, the above objective is simultane-
ously conducted between multiple (N − 1) pairs of meta-
train and meta-test domains in each iteration. This adopts
a fine-grained learning strategy that meta-learning is simul-
taneously conducted in a variety of domain shift scenarios
in each iteration. Thus our face anti-spoofing model can be
trained to generalize well to unseen attacks of various sce-
narios in each iteration.
Experiments
Datasets
The evaluation of our method is conducted on four public
face anti-spoofing datasets that contain both print and video
replay attacks: Oulu-NPU (Boulkenafet and et al 2017) (O
for short), CASIA-MFSD (Zhang and et al 2012) (C for
short), Idiap Replay-Attack (Chingovska, Anjos, and Mar-
cel 2012) (I for short), and MSU-MFSD (Wen, Han, and
Jain 2015) (M for short). Table 1 in the supplementary mate-
rial1 shows the variations in these four datasets. Figure 1 in
the supplementary material shows some samples of the gen-
uine faces and attacks. Table 1 and Fig. 1 in supplementary
material show that compared to the seen training data, at-
tacks from unseen materials, illumination, background, res-
olution and so on cause significant domain shifts among
these datasets.
1Codes are available at https://github.com/rshaojimmy/AAAI2020-
RFMetaFAS
Experimental Setting
Following the setting in (Shao et al. 2019), one dataset is
treated as one domain in our experiment. We randomly se-
lect three datasets in four as source domains where domain
generalization is conducted. The left one is the unseen do-
main for testing, which is unavailable in the training process.
Half Total Error Rate (HTER) (Bengio and Marie´thoz 2004)
(half of the summation of false acceptance rate and false re-
jection rate) and Area Under Curve (AUC) are used as the
evaluation metrics in our experiments.
Implementation Details
Network Structure. Our deep network is implemented on
the platform of PyTorch. The detailed structure of the pro-
posed network is illustrated in Table 2 in the supplementary
material. Training Details. The Adam optimizer (Kingma
and Ba 2014) is used for the optimization. The learning rates
α, β are set as 1e-3. The batch size is 20 per domain, and
thus 60 for 3 training domains totally. Testing. For a new
testing sample x, its classification score l is calculated for
testing as follows: l = M(F (x)), where F and M are the
trained feature extractor and meta learner.
Experimental Comparison
Baseline Methods. We compare several state-of-the-art
face anti-spoofing methods as follows: Multi-Scale LBP
(MS LBP) (Ma¨a¨tta¨, Hadid, and Pietika¨inen 2011) ; Bi-
nary CNN (Yang, Lei, and Li. 2014); Image Distortion
Analysis (IDA) (Wen, Han, and Jain 2015); Color Texture
(CT) (Boulkenafet, Komulainen, and Hadid 2016); LBP-
TOP (Pereira and et al 2014); Auxiliary (Liu, Jourabloo,
and Liu 2018): To fairly compare our method only using
one frame information, we implement its face depth estima-
tion component(denoted as Auxiliary(Depth Only)). We also
compare its reported results (denoted as Auxiliary(All));
MMD-AAE (Li et al. 2018b); and MADDG (Shao et al.
2019). Moreover, we also compare the related state-of-the-
art meta-learning for DG methods in the face anti-spoofing
task: MLDG (Li et al. 2018a); Reptile (Nichol, Achiam, and
Schulman. 2018); and MetaReg (Balaji and et al 2018).
Comparison Results. From comparison results in Table
1 and Fig. 4, it can be seen that the proposed method
outperforms the state-of-the-art face anti-spoofing meth-
ods (Ma¨a¨tta¨, Hadid, and Pietika¨inen 2011; Yang, Lei, and
Li. 2014; Wen, Han, and Jain 2015; Boulkenafet, Komu-
lainen, and Hadid 2016; Liu, Jourabloo, and Liu 2018).
This is because all these methods focus on extracting dif-
ferentiation cues the only fit to attacks in the source do-
mains. Comparatively, the proposed meta-learning for DG
trains our face anti-spoofing model to generalize well in
the simulated domain shift scenario. This significantly im-
proves the generalization ability of the face anti-spoofing
method. Moreover, we also compare the DG with adversar-
ial learning methods for face anti-spoofing (Li et al. 2018b;
Shao et al. 2019) and our method also performs better. This
is because instead of focusing on learning a domain shared
feature space and training extra domain discriminators, our
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Figure 4: ROC curves of four testing sets for domain generalization on face anti-spoofing.
Table 1: Comparison to face anti-spoofing methods on four testing sets for domain generalization on face anti-spoofing.
Method O&C&I to M O&M&I to C O&C&M to I I&C&M to OHTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%)
MS LBP 29.76 78.50 54.28 44.98 50.30 51.64 50.29 49.31
Binary CNN 29.25 82.87 34.88 71.94 34.47 65.88 29.61 77.54
IDA 66.67 27.86 55.17 39.05 28.35 78.25 54.20 44.59
Color Texture 28.09 78.47 30.58 76.89 40.40 62.78 63.59 32.71
LBPTOP 36.90 70.80 42.60 61.05 49.45 49.54 53.15 44.09
Auxiliary(Depth Only) 22.72 85.88 33.52 73.15 29.14 71.69 30.17 77.61
Auxiliary(All) – – 28.4 – 27.6 – – –
MMD-AAE 27.08 83.19 44.59 58.29 31.58 75.18 40.98 63.08
MADDG 17.69 88.06 24.5 84.51 22.19 84.99 27.98 80.02
Ours 13.89 93.98 20.27 88.16 17.3 90.48 16.45 91.16
Table 2: Comparison to meta-learning for DG methods on four testing sets for domain generalization on face anti-spoofing.
Method O&C&I to M O&M&I to C O&C&M to I I&C&M to OHTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%)
Reptile 23.64 85.06 30.38 78.10 36.13 69.01 22.88 82.22
MLDG 23.91 84.81 32.75 74.51 36.55 68.54 25.75 79.52
MetaReg 21.17 86.11 35.66 70.83 32.28 67.48 37.72 68.71
Ours 13.89 93.98 20.27 88.16 17.3 90.48 16.45 91.16
method just needs to train a simple network with meta-
learning strategy. This realizes the DG for face anti-spoofing
in a more feasible and efficient way.
Table 2 and Fig. 4 show that compared to some state-
of-the-art vanilla meta-learning for DG methods (Li et al.
2018a; Nichol, Achiam, and Schulman. 2018), our method
also outperforms them for the task of face anti-spoofing.
This illustrates that by addressing the above two issues, the
proposed meta-learning framework is more able to improve
the generalization ability for the task of face anti-spoofing.
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Figure 5: Evaluation of different components of proposed
method in O&M&I to C set for face anti-spoofing.
Components Evaluation. Considering that O&M&I to C
set has the most significant domain shift, we evaluate differ-
ent components of our method in this set for an example and
experimental results are shown in Fig. 5. Ours denotes the
proposed method. Ours wo/meta denotes the proposed net-
work without the meta-learning component. In this setting,
we do not conduct the meta-learning in the meta learner part.
Ours wo/reg denotes the proposed network without domain
knowledge regularization. In this setting, we do not incorpo-
rate the face depth maps as the domain knowledge to regu-
larize the meta-learning process.
Figure 5 shows that the proposed network has degraded
performance if any component is excluded. Specifically, the
results of Ours wo/meta verify that the meta-learning con-
ducted in the meta learner benefits for the generalization
ability improvement. The results of Ours wo/reg show that
without the regularization of domain knowledge supervi-
sion, the performance of our meta-learning for DG degrades
significantly. This validates that by addressing the first is-
sue, the proposed meta-learning framework is more able to
develop a generalized face anti-spoofing model.
Table 3: Effectiveness of fine-grained learning strategy and second-order derivative information
Method O&C&I to M O&M&I to C O&C&M to I I&C&M to OHTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%) HTER(%) AUC(%)
Ours (Aggregation) 14.54 92.87 24.28 85.29 20.07 88.13 17.94 90.69
Ours (First-order) 17.93 87.36 27.47 82.17 26.24 79.32 19.24 87.82
Ours 13.89 93.98 20.27 88.16 17.3 90.48 16.45 91.16
Binary CNNOriginal Ours
Figure 6: Attention map visualization of Binary CNN and
our method for testing samples of attacks in O&M&I to C
set. (Best reviewed in colors)
Effectiveness of fine-grained learning strategy and
second-order derivative information. As mentioned in
the above analysis, compared to vanilla meta-learning for
DG methods, our method adopts a fine-grained learning
strategy which can help to develop face anti-spoofing model
with the generalization ability to unseen attacks of vari-
ous scenarios. To verify the effectiveness of this strategy,
we conduct our method in the setting proposed in (Li et
al. 2018a), where the proposed regularized meta-learning
is only conducted between one aggregated meta-train and
one aggregated meta-test domains in each training iteration.
The comparison results are named as Ours (aggregation) in
Table 3. Table 3 shows that our method obtains better per-
formance than Ours (aggregation). This validates that the
proposed meta-learning adopting fine-grained learning strat-
egy is more able to improve the generalization ability for
the task of face anti-spoofing. Moreover, the third term in
(10) has the function of coordinating the learning of meta-
train and meta-test so as to prevent the optimization process
from overfitting to a single domain. This improves the gen-
eralization ability but at the same time involves the second-
order derivative computation of parameters of meta learner.
Some works such as Reptile (Nichol, Achiam, and Schul-
man. 2018) uses a first-order approximation to decrease the
computation complexity. We thus compare a method named
as Ours (First-order) in Table 3 that replaces the second-
order derivative computation in meta learner with the first-
order approximation proposed in Reptile (Nichol, Achiam,
and Schulman. 2018). Results show that our method per-
forms better, which verifies that the second-order derivative
information in the third term of (10) is more effective and
plays a key role in the generalization ability improvement
for the task of face anti-spoofing.
Attention Map Visualization
To provide more insights on why our method improves the
generalization ability for the task of face anti-spoofing, we
visualize the attention map of networks by the Global Av-
erage Pooling (GAP) method (Zhou et al. 2016). Figure 6
shows some examples of visualization results for the testing
samples of attacks between Binary CNN (Yang, Lei, and Li.
2014) and our method. In (Yang, Lei, and Li. 2014), authors
train a CNN only with supervision of binary class labels
in the face anti-spoofing task. This makes the model focus
on capturing biased differentiation cues with poor general-
ization ability. In the visualization of Binary CNN of Fig.
6, it can be seen that when encountering unseen testing at-
tacks, this method pays the most attention to extracting the
differentiation cues in the background (row 1-2) or on pa-
per edges/holding fingers (row 3-5). These differentiation
cues are not generalized because they will be changed if the
attacks are from a new background or without clear paper
edges. Comparatively, Fig. 6 shows that our method always
focuses on the region of internal face for searching differen-
tiation cues. These differentiation cues are more likely to be
intrinsic and generalized for face anti-spoofing and thus the
generalization ability of our method can be improved.
Conclusion
To improve the generalization ability of face anti-spoofing
methods, this paper casts face anti-spoofing as a domain
generalization problem, which is addressed in a new regu-
larized fine-grained meta-learning framework. The proposed
framework conducts meta-learning in the feature space reg-
ularized by the domain knowledge supervision. In this
way, better-generalized learning information for face anti-
spoofing can be meta-learned. Besides, a fine-grained learn-
ing strategy is adopted which enables a variety of domain
shift scenarios to be simultaneously exploited for meta-
learning so that our model can be trained to generalize well
to unseen attacks of various scenarios. Comprehensive ex-
perimental results validate the effectiveness of the proposed
method statistically and visually.
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Supplementary Material
Datasets
Table 4: Comparison of four experimental datasets.
Dataset
Light
variation
Complex
background
Attack
type
Display
devices
C No Yes
Printed photo
Cut photo
Replayed video
iPad
I Yes Yes
Printed photo
Display photo
Replayed video
iPhone 3GS
iPad
M No Yes
Printed photo
Replayed video
iPad Air
iPhone 5S
O Yes No
Printed photo
Display photo
Replayed video
Dell 1905FP
Macbook Retina
The evaluation of our method is conducted on four public
face anti-spoofing datasets that contain both print and video
replay attacks: Oulu-NPU (Boulkenafet and et al 2017) (O
for short), CASIA-MFSD (Zhang and et al 2012) (C for
short), Idiap Replay-Attack (Chingovska, Anjos, and Mar-
cel 2012) (I for short), and MSU-MFSD (Wen, Han, and Jain
2015) (M for short). From Table 4 and Fig. 7, it can be seen
that many kinds of variations, due to the differences on ma-
terials, illumination, background, resolution and so on, ex-
ist across these four datasets. Therefore, significant domain
shift exists among these datasets.
Network Structure
The detailed structure of the proposed network is illustrated
in Table 5. To be specific, each convolutional layer in the
feature extractor, meta learner and depth estimator is fol-
lowed by a batch normalization layer and a rectified linear
unit (ReLU) activation function, and all convolutional ker-
nel size is 3×3. The size of input image is 256 × 256 × 6,
where we extract the RGB and HSV channels of each input
image. Inspired by the residual network (He et al. 2016), we
use a short-cut connection, which is concatenating the re-
sponses of pool1-1, pool1-2 and pool1-3, and sending them
to conv3-1 for depth estimation. This operation helps to ease
the training procedure.
(a) CASIA (b) Idiap (c) MSU (d) Oulu
Figure 7: Sample frames from CASIA-MFSD (Zhang and et al 2012), Idiap Replay-Attack (Chingovska, Anjos, and Marcel
2012), MSU-MFSD (Wen, Han, and Jain 2015), and Oulu-NPU (Boulkenafet and et al 2017) datasets. The figures with green
border represent the real faces, while the ones with red border represent the video replay attacks. From these examples, it can
be seen that large cross-dataset variations due to the differences on materials, illumination, background, resolution and so on,
cause significant domain shift among these datasets.
Table 5: The structure details of all components of the proposed network.
Feature Extractor
Layer Chan./Stri. Out.Size
Meta Learner
Layer Chan./Stri. Outp.Size
Depth Estimator
Layer Chan./Stri. Outp.Size
Input
image
Input
pool1-3
Input
pool1-1+pool1-2+pool1-3
conv1-1 64/1 256 conv2-1 128/1 32 conv3-1 128/1 32
conv1-2 128/1 256 pool2-1 -/2 16 conv3-2 64/1 32
conv1-3 196/1 256 conv2-2 256/1 16 conv3-3 1/1 32
conv1-4 128/1 256 pool2-2 -/2 8
pool1-1 -/2 128 conv2-2 512/1 8
conv1-5 128/1 128 Average pooling
conv1-6 196/1 128 fc2-1 1/1 1
conv1-7 128/1 128
pool1-2 -/2 64
conv1-8 128/1 64
conv1-9 196/1 64
conv1-10 128/1 64
pool1-3 -/2 32
